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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT OF CROSS-
EXAMINATION-SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE
Recently, the West Virginia legislature passed a sexual assault
statute' which contains provisions limiting a defendant's ability to
cross-examine the victim of a forcible rape about her prior sexual
conduct. Traditionally, the prior sexual conduct of the victim, with
the defendant or with others, has been admitted into evidence for
many reasons.2 Under the new statute, only "evidence of specific
instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant
shall be admissible on the issue of consent. . . ."I This limitation
on the scope of the defendant's cross-examination raises the possi-
bility that the defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine
his adverse witnesses is violated by the statutory provisions. The
purpose of this article is to analyze the approach of the United
States Supreme Court toward violations of the constitutional right
of cross-examination, and to consider the new rape statute in rela-
tion to the Court's approach.
The right of a criminal defendant to cross-examine his adverse
witnesses has long been recognized as a constitutional right. The
basic source of this right is the fourteenth amendment which pro-
vides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . ."I Due process essen-
tially guarantees a citizen a fair trial.5 In a criminal proceeding the
defendant has "the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
State's accusations"' by testing the truth of the state's version of
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1 to -13 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2 Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause? 9
IND. L. REv. 418, 423-35 (1976).
In the past, in West Virginia, the victim's character for chastity had been
relevant to the issue of consent. E.g., State v. Franklin, 139 W. Va. 43, 65-67, 79
S.E.2d 692, 704-05 (1953).
3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-12 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The statute provides that
evidence of "prior sexual conduct with the defendant" is admissible only if "such
evidence [is] heard first out of the presence of the jury [and] is found by the judge
to be relevant." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-12(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976). "[Elvidence
of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct with persons other than the
defendant" and any reputation or opinion evidence of the victim's sexual history
is inadmissible, unless the victim first introduces evidence on the issue. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-8B-12(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
1 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
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the facts, and by putting his own version before the jury. Cross-
examination is an essential part of this fair trial process, for it
functions as a device to test the reliability of the state's witnesses,
for example, testing a witness' reputation for truth, and ability to
accurately perceive facts.7 In Mr. Justice Black's words, "[a] per-
son's right to . . .an opportunity to be heard in his defense...
include[s], as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses
against him . . . ."I In the absence of such a procedural safe-
guard, the fairness of the trial process could be seriously endan-
gered.
Traditionally, the actual scope of cross-examination is a state
concern, "for the States under our federal system have the princi-
pal responsibility for defining and prosecuting crimes." 9 The state
rules of evidence set forth which particular lines of inquiry are
admissible, or inadmissible, to test an adverse witness.'° The Court
will interfere with a state ruling, such as a limitation on the con-
tent of cross-examination, only when such a ruling "offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental. ""
While the Court has clearly recognized a defendant's right of
cross-examination as a constitutional right, such clear recognition
has extended only to the validity of cross-examination as a proce-
dural technique to assure truth."2 The Court has been considerably
' C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 29, 33 (2d ed. 1972); see 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1367-68 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
The main functions of cross-examination are to further develop the direct
issues in a case, and to test the witness' credibility by revealing bias, reputation
for veracity, prior inconsistent statements, and ability to perceive and remember
the facts. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 29, 33 (2d ed. 1972).
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959).
" For example, the majority of courts, for impeachment purposes, only allow
evidence of the witness' misconduct when the misconduct has some relation to
veracity. And some courts, for impeachment purposes, prohibit all evidence of
misconduct. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 42, at 82-83 (2d ed. 1972).
" Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (emphasis
added).
In another case, Mr. Justice Cardozo described these fundamental rights as
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, .. valid as against the States." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937).
22 According to one commentator, the Constitution only prescribes which
"mode of procedure shall be followed-i.e., a cross-examining procedure. . . ." and
[Vol. 79
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more reluctant to recognize that the actual content or substance
of cross-examination is fundamental enough to be a constitutional
concern. The Court says that a defendant has a fundamental right
to an effective cross-examination,' 3 and will determine, in some
cases, that trial court limitations on particular lines of inquiry
unconstitutionally deny effective cross-examination to the defen-
dant. But analysis of these cases shows that the Court's involve-
ment in this area is, at most, cautious. The Court seems unwilling
to take a strong enforcement stand, and as yet, has neither relied
on, nor set forth, any clear standard of the minimal requirements
for effectiveness. The guidelines the Court does seem to rely on to
determine effectiveness indicate reluctance to take control over the
actual scope of lines of inquiry on cross-examination.
In the past, the Court did not focus on the actual minimum
requirements of cross-examination. The Court's approach was to
find that the right to cross-examination was enforceable as a fun-
damental right only when the "totality of the circumstances ren-
dered the trial unfair under state procedure."' 4 In In re Oliver, '5 the
defendant was sentenced to jail without a full trial. The Court
found that the denial of any cross-examination was a constitu-
tional violation when the denial of several substantial rights ren-
dered the proceeding unfair.'" But in Stein v. New York,' 7 when the
not 'what kinds of testimonial statements" are actually to be given. 5 J. WIGMORE,
EvIDENCE § 1397, at 159 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
11 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974); Douglas v. Alabama, 280 U.S. 415,
420 (1965) (effective confrontation).
" Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08, 116-17 (1934) (Cardozo,
J.) (defendant's right to be present in the courtroom). See generally Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring opinion) (brief
discussion of the totality of the circumstances approach).
Is 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The defendant was sentenced to jail for contempt of
court, without a full trial. The Court held that due process guarantees that no one
can be sentenced to prison by a secret proceeding, and that a defendant must have
"a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charge" which includes the
right to cross-examination, as well as, the right to counsel, and the right to call
witnesses on his behalf. Id. at 273.
11 333 U.S. at 273, 278.
17 346 U.S. 156 (1953). The jury found the three defendants guilty of murder.
Two of the defendants had confessed. The third defendant had not confessed, but
his guilt was suggested by the other two confessions. He was unable to cross-
examine the co-defendants because they did not testify at trial. The Court found
the denial of confrontation did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id.
at 195-96. The Court also stated that the totality of the other evidence was "not
[to] be held constitutionally or legally insufficient to warrant [the conviction]
. ." Id. at 191.
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defendant was convicted as a result of the confessions of his co-
defendants who did not testify at trial, the Court found that the
totality of the evidence established the guilt of all three defen-
dants,"8 and that the complete denial of cross-examination to the
third defendant was not a constitutional violation. 9 So, the Court's
primary focus was on the totality of the requirements for a fair
trial.
Recent cases indicate that the Court is moving toward viewing
effective cross-examination as a fundamental constitutional right,
in itself, regardless of the totality of the circumstances. In 1965, the
Court incorporated the confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment into the fourteenth amendment due process clause.2 ' Cross-
examination was held to be an essential element of confrontation."
Incorporation is a device by which the Court is saying that cross-
examination is a fundamental right, in itself, and essential to any
fair trial. 2
In subsequent cases the Court focused on the cross-
examination itself to see whether denial of a particular line of
inquiry resulted in ineffective cross-examination. Construed
broadly, such cases indicate that the Court could be setting up an
enforceable minimum standard for effectiveness in the form of a
rule suggesting that the denial of some particular lines of inquiry
is, per se, a constitutional violation. In Smith v. Illinois,2' the
Court found that a state court denial of a line of inquiry as to the
adverse witness' real name and present address was a constitu-
tional violation. The Court said that "[t]o forbid this most rudi-
mentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the
right of cross-examination itself."" In Davis v. Alaska,28 the Court
,1 346 U.S. at 190-92.
1, Id. at 195-96.
The confrontation clause provides that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him
.... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
n2 Id. at 404. See also 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395, at 150; § 1397, at 158
(Chadbourn rev. 1974).
23 Note, Criminal Procedure-Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation Made
Obligatory in State Prosecutions, 44 N.C. L. REv. 173, 178-80 (1965). See also
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting opinion)
(discussion of incorporation).
24 390 U.S. 129 (1968).
Id. at 131.
28 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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found that a statutory denial of a line of inquiry as to a juvenile
witness' past record with the police was a constitutional violation.
The Court said that "the right of confrontation is paramount to the
State's policy of protecting a juvenile offender. Whatever tempo-
rary embarrassment might result to [the witness] . . .by disclo-
sure of his juvenile record . . . is outweighed by . . .
[defendant's] right . . . ."2 Indeed, an even broader interpreta-
tion suggests that the Court is moving toward a position that any
state limitation of the scope of cross-examination may deny effec-
tiveness."
Under such a broad interpretation, a statutory limitation on
a defendant's inquiry into a victim's prior sexual conduct might be
a per se constitutional violation. Such a denial of inquiry is similar
to the denial of inquiry in Davis v. Alaska.2" In Davis, the Court
acknowledged that the state had an interest in preserving "the
anonymity of. . .juvenile offenders. '3 As the state argued, the
"exposure of a juvenile's record . .. would likely cause impair-
ment of rehabilitative goals . . . " and "cause the juvenile of-
fender to lose employment opportunities or otherwise suffer unnec-
essarily. . .. ,,3 But the Court said that such "temporary embar-
rassment" 2 is not as important as the defendant's right to confron-
tation. One of the major policy reasons for the new rape statute is
that it protects the victim from the humiliation of almost being on
trial, herself.- A state law which excludes a victim's sexual con-
" Id. at 319.
Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior
Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection
of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFsTRA L. REv. 403, 422-23 (1975).
21 Id. at 422. The author says that "[tihe Davis case is analogous to, and
should control, the situation where the state, in a prosecution for forcible rape, must
prove lack of consent . "Id.
415 U.S. at 319.
31 Id.
32 Id.
3 See Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the
Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflec-
tion of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 403, 422 (1975); Note,
Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause?, 9 IND. L. REv.
418 (1976).
However, state policy reasons for the rape law may be stronger than reasons
for the juvenile law. One commentator has suggested that a major reason for the
rape reform is that the state wants to encourage the reporting of rape and get more
convictions. Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALM. L.
Rav. 919, 938-41 (1973).
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duct in order to protect the victim from humiliation and damage
to reputation is not much different from a state law which excludes
a juvenile's police record, in order to protect the juvenile from
embarrassment.
The problem with such a broad interpretation is that it places
the Court in the position of controlling the rules of cross-
examination. "[Tihe Constitution is too blunt an instrument to
regulate the procedural and evidentiary details of criminal prose-
cutions. '34 Speaking of constitutional control of the rules of hear-
say, one commentator has said that it is not "that there is no room
in the Constitution for a requirement of some measure of eviden-
tiary reliability. 3 5 In this area, however, "rules of law must be
rules of thumb. '36 Judges need "broad categories of admissibil-
ity"37 which lead to a quick decision based on the subtleties of the
details of each trial. Judges do not have time for constitutional
analysis at each step of admitting evidence. Furthermore, as Mr.
Justice Harlan has said, "[n]othing in this language [of the Con-
frontation Clause] . . .would connote a purpose to control the
scope of the rules of evidence.
38
Most importantly, a deeper analysis of the cases shows that
although the Court has shifted towards viewing the right of effec-
tive cross-examination as a fundamental right in itself, the Court
is not willing to go so far as to set up per se rules as to the effective-
ness of particular lines of inquiry. The Court seems reluctant to
take on such control of the rules of evidence.
In one recent case, Chambers v. Mississippi,"5 the Court con-
tinued to use the familiar totality of the circumstances approach
to find that the denial of cross-examination was a fundamental
right only when, under all the circumstances, the trial was unfair.
In Chambers, the state voucher rule against impeaching ones own
witness prevented the defendant from showing that the witness
had previously confessed to the crime for which the defendant was
convicted. In addition, the trial court's application of the state
" Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to Prepare a
Defense, 56 GEo. L.J. 939 (1968).
Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.J. 1434, 1438 (1966).
Id. at 1437.
'Id.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring opinion).
:' 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
[Vol. 79
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hearsay rule prevented the defendant from presenting key wit-
nesses in his own defense. The Court held that the denial of cross-
examination, "coupled with" the exclusion of the favorable wit-
nesses, "denied [the defendant] . . . a trial in accord with . . .
due process."40 Furthermore, the Court strictly limited the holding
to the "facts and circumstances of this case"'" which altogether
denied a fair trial to the defendant. The Court said that it was
establishing "no new principles of constitutional law" and was
granting the states all the "respect traditionally accorded to
[them] . . . in the establishment and implementation of their
own criminal . . . rules and procedures.
4 2
Other recent cases depart somewhat from the totality of the
circumstances approach and set forth some guidelines to a stan-
dard for constitutionally effective cross-examination. But these
guidelines are nothing more than a flexible boundary formed by a
constellation of factors. In Davis v. Alaska,4" the trial court fol-
lowed the state law and issued a protective order which prohibited
the defendant from questioning the witness as to his status as a
juvenile offender. The defendant was thus precluded from follow-
ing a line of inquiry that was designed to bring out the witness'
possible bias from connection with the police. The Court held that
even though defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness as to other matters, the denial of such an inquiry violated
the defendant's right to effective cross-examination.4
The Davis Court relied on several factors 5 to determine
whether the cross-examination was effective. The witness was a
crucial witness; he was the only one who identified the defendant
and placed him at the scene of the crime. So, "[t]he accuracy and
truthfulness of [his] . . . testimony were key elements in the
11 Id. at 302. The Court did not decide whether the denial of cross-examination
alone would cause reversal, since the denial of due process was a result of the
conjunction of the denial of cross-examination with the refusal to allow the defen-
dant to call favorable witnesses. Id. at 298. Furthermore, the Court was careful to
say that, although the right to cross-examination "is implicit in the constitutional
right of confrontation, . . . [it] is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow
to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Id. at 295.
410 U.S. at 303.
42 Id. at 302-03.
43 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
" Id. at 318.
41 Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defen-
dant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MicH. L. REv. 1465, 1469-73
(1975).
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State's case . . . ."" Also, the goal of the inquiry was valid; a
cross-examiner is "permitted to . . .test the witness' perceptions
and memory . . .[and] to impeach . . . the witness."'" Indeed,
revelation of the "possible biases . . . of the witness as they may
relate directly to the issues"' 8 is "always relevant as discrediting
the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony."'" Further-
more, the inadmissible evidence would have been strong proba-
tive of the witness' possible bias. Since the witness was on proba-
tion for a similar crime, he had "possible concern that he might
be a suspect in the investigation" 0 or that he might lose his proba-
tionary status if he did not lie. Finally, the Court felt that the
defendant had been allowed no other adequate line of inquiry to
show that the witness lacked credibility. "While counsel was per-
mitted to ask [witness] . . .whether he was biased, counsel was
unable to make a record from which to argue why [witness] . . .
might have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impar-
tiality expected of a witness at trial."5'
Davis v. Alaska is the only case in which the Court specifically
relied on all of these factors to find a denial of effectiveness. But
other recent cases reveal a similar approach.52 In Smith v. Illinois,"
the Court held that a defendant was constitutionally entitled to
ask preliminary questions as to the witness' real name and present
address. Such a holding would seem to indicate that the Court is
setting up at least one per se minimum standard of effectiveness,
which is that an effective cross-examination must allow prelimi-
nary questions. But the absolute nature of even this requirement
415 U.S. at 317.
' Id. at 316.
48 Id.
Id. quoting 3A J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
415 U.S. at 318.
Id.
52 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). The principal witness refused to
answer any questions, so his confession was read to him under the guise of refreshing
his memory. The confession indicated that the defendant was guilty, but the defen-
dant had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to the contents of the
confession. The Court held that since the only direct evidence of the defendant's
guilt was in the confession, the confession was "a crucial link in the proof" and the
denial of cross-examination deprived the defendant of effective cross-examination.
Id. at 419. Furthermore, the Court relied on the fact that cross-examination would
have been especially probative to dispel the jury's inference, from the witness'
refusal to testify, that the confession was true. Id.
390 U.S. 129 (1968).
[Vol. 79
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is uncertain. 54 Lower courts have successfully held that denial of
preliminary questions was not a constitutional violation when the
witness was not crucial,55 and when the defendant was allowed
adequately to cross-examine the witness by other lines of inquiry. 6
Under this more narrow interpretation of the Court's .ap-
proach, it is unlikely that the Court will find that the evidentiary
limitations of the new rape statute57 unconstitutionally deny effec-
tive cross-examination. By the Court's present factorial test, in-
quiry into prior sexual conduct is not always essential to effective-
ness. In a rape case, the victim is usually the crucial witness, since
she is the only one, besides the defendant, who was present at the
crime. But the goal of the inquiry into her prior sexual conduct is
not always valid. Since consent is a direct issue in a rape case,
cross-examination to elicit further evidence on the direct issue of
consent is always valid.5" Impeachment of the credibility of the
victim, through a showing of bias, prior inconsistent statements,
lack of capacity to observe and remember facts, and reputation for
truthfulness, is also a valid goal of cross-examination. 5 But the
general rule of evidence is that impeaching the credibility of a
witness by introducing character evidence, other than that related
to truthfulness, is not a valid goal.6"
Most importantly, the evidence of a victim's prior sexual con-
duct is usually not helpful in achieving such goals. On the issue of
consent, the victim's previous sexual conduct with others is not
highly probative of whether the victim consented to sexual rela-
tions with the defendant. Past evidentiary rulings which held that
such conduct was probative on the issues of consent were based on
an outdated morality that women who had sexual relations outside
11 See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). The Court held that such
preliminary questioning, which identified the witness with his setting, was essential
to any cross-examination. But the Court also relied on the fact that the goal of the
preliminary questioning was to show that the witness was biased because h6 was
under "coercive effect of his detention" by officers of the United States. Id. at 693.
" United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1046 (1970).
11 United States v. Lee, 413 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 916
(1969); United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969),cert. denied, 402 U.S.
949 (1971).
" See note 3 supra.
See note 7 supra.
' See note 7 supra.
C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 44 (2d ed. 1972).
9
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of marriage were "morally depraved" and more likely to consent
to sexual relations again when given any opportunity." Society's
morality is quite different today. It is no longer "taboo for a woman
to have consented to sexual relations with more than one man in
her lifetime. She is free to exercise her consent .. ". . I' The fact
that she has consented with one man does not logically mean that
her state of mind toward the defendant was ever consensual in
nature. 3 As one commentator has summarized the situation,
"[t]he relationship between a woman's chastity and whether or
not she has been raped is simply too attenuated to warrant consid-
eration as relevant evidence."'" It is possible, however, that habit-
ual sexual conduct with others, as in prostitution, may be relevant
in some cases. 5 Finally, the fact that a woman is unchaste, and
therefore, possibly of a bad moral character, has little, if any,
bearing on her truthfulness."
In conclusion, the Court's approach to enforcing violations of
a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is
to enforce the right only if effective cross-examination has been
denied. The Court seems reluctant to find that effective cross-
examination has been denied, and basically relies only on a weak
factorial test to determine effectiveness. Under this test, it is un-
11 Note, California Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1551 n.3, 1522 n.10, 1561 n.56 (1975) citing Summary of the Hearing
on Revising California Laws Relating to Rape Before the Assembly Criminal Justice
Committee and the California Commission on the Status of Women, Cal. Legis.,
Reg. Sess. (1973-74).
"2 Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause?,
9 IND. L. REv. 418, 429 (1976).
11 Id. at 429-30. See Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist
View, 11 Am. CaIM. L. REV. 335, 338-45 (1973) citing Amir, Victim Precipitated
Forcible Rape, 58 J. CaIM. L.C. & P.S. 493 (1967) (study conducted on 646 rape
cases).
6 Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv.
919, 939 (1973) citing Lucky & Nass, A Comparison of Sexual Attitudes and Behav-
ior in an International Sample, 31 J. of MARRIAGE AND THE FAMmY 364 (1969); Vener
& Stewart, The Sexual Behavior of Adolescents in Middle America: Generational
and American-British Comparisons, 34 J. of MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 696 (1972).
65 Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause?,
9 IND. L. REv. 418, 430-31 (1976).
68 Id. at 434. The statutory restrictions on the admission of evidence of prior
sexual conduct to impeach the victim will probably not be challenged. At common
law, evidence of reputation for chastity was not admissible to impeach the witness'
credibility. State v. Franklin, 139 W. Va. 43, 64-65, 79 S.E.2d 692, 704 (1953); State
v. Detwiler, 60 W. Va. 583, 585, 55 S.E. 654, 655 (1906).
[Vol. 79
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likely that West Virginia's new rape reform statute denies effective
cross-examination to the defendant.
Priscilla L. Swalm
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